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Partial martial law meaning9/6/2023 ![]() Putin formulated the new political goal of the “special operation” at a recent press conference in Astana: to preserve a Russian land corridor to Crimea along the shore of the Azov Sea and along the left bank of the Dnieper River, to ensure that Kyiv no longer controls the water supply to the Crimean Peninsula. Today, the fighting is to try to ensure that the area controlled by Russia remains bigger than it was on February 23, before the invasion was launched, and that it does not slide back beyond the borders established in 2014–2015. In September, following the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the battle to keep hold of those newly taken territories began. By August, it was clear that the army of contract soldiers and the military hardware at their disposal were insufficient to radically expand the area controlled by Russian troops beyond what they had seized back in February and March-with the exception of the north of the Luhansk region. In doing so, it lost any chance of dictating the terms of capitulation to Kyiv.įrom April to September, the battle being fought was over the physical borders of the part of Ukraine controlled by Russian forces. Moscow pulled back its exhausted divisions from around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy back in April, along with some divisions from around Kharkiv. That battle was already lost by the middle of March, when Russian troops failed to enter Kyiv, and today those aims are simply unachievable. The Kremlin was counting on being able to use a limited show of strength to force out the EU and NATO from Ukraine once and for all. The “special military operation” was conceived as a way to establish Russia’s political and military control over all or most of Ukraine’s territory by bringing about regime change in Kyiv. The discrepancy between the strategic goals and the means allocated for achieving those goals was the main cause of Russia’s military failures from February through to September. Surovikin has also been ordered to bring the political goals of the “special operation” in line with Russia’s actual military and economic capacity, given that the enemy’s logistic and operational support are being provided by the entire NATO bloc at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. Surovikin will take responsibility for these decisions to avoid the risk of destabilization within Russia itself. They will withdraw even if that means giving up large, symbolically important territories that are hard to defend, such as the right bank of the Dnieper River or the north of the Luhansk region. The new commander for operations in Ukraine has the authority to make “difficult decisions” on withdrawing troops to more advantageous defensive positions that the Ukrainian forces cannot penetrate. The economic and human mobilization should make it possible to continue the simmering “special military operation” until 2023, nothing more. The new state-of-emergency laws introduced by the Kremlin in October are also aimed at being able to provide a strategic defense of the “captured objectives” rather than all-out warfare to the bitter end. But to hold and control the territory occupied by Russia behind the lines, even people with fifty-year-old AKM automatic rifles will do. The poor level of the training and equipment given to newly mobilized troops means they cannot be used in offensive operations. Partial mobilization was needed, as President Vladimir Putin openly said, in order to hold a front line a thousand kilometers long. ![]() Moscow needs a lengthy pause in the fighting in order to rebuild combat-ready ground troops almost from scratch. Russia’s critical lack of modern military hardware prevents it from being able to launch offensives against its better-equipped enemy. Certainly there is no question of any new large-scale offensive into Ukrainian territory. That is all the Russian command is capable of right now. ![]() In other words, Russia aims to put a stop to the intensive fighting before winter sets in, effectively freezing the conflict and retaining the territorial gains it has made so far. Russia intends to build a solid and durable line of defense in the territories it has occupied in order to prevent any major breaches by the Ukrainian armed forces or any further shifts in the new borders. Surovikin’s strategy and mandate can be summarized as switching to strategic defense on all fronts, with the possibility of diversionary attacks and local tactical offensives to improve Russia’s positions. ![]() The appointment of General Sergei Surovikin as the new commander of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, together with the elements of martial law announced by the Kremlin, gives some clues as to Russia’s medium-term military and political goals in Ukraine. ![]()
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